The claim that certain emotions are universally recognized from facial expressions is based primarily on the study of expressions that were posed. The current study was of spontaneous facial expressions shown by aborigines in Papua New Guinea (Ekman, 1980) ; 17 faces claimed to convey one (or, in the case of blends, two) basic emotions and five faces claimed to show other universal feelings. For each face, participants rated the degree to which each of the 12 predicted emotions or feelings was conveyed. The modal choice for English-speaking Americans (n ϭ 60), English-speaking Palestinians (n ϭ 60), and Arabic-speaking Palestinians (n ϭ 44) was the predicted label for only 4, 5, and 4, respectively, of the 17 faces for basic emotions, and for only 2, 2, and 2, respectively, of the 5 faces for other feelings. Observers endorsed the predicted emotion or feeling moderately often (65%, 55%, and 44%), but also denied it moderately often (35%, 45%, and 56%). They also endorsed more than one (or, for blends, two) label(s) in each face-on average, 2.3, 2.3, and 1.5 of basic emotions and 2.6, 2.2, and 1.5 of other feelings. There were both similarities and differences across culture and language, but the emotional meaning of a facial expression is not well captured by the predicted label(s) or, indeed, by any single label.
For a generation now, much research and theorizing in the psychology of emotion has relied on the Universality Thesis, articulated by Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1972) as follows: "Regardless of the language, of whether the culture is Western or Eastern, industrialized or preliterate, [certain] facial expressions are labeled with the same emotion terms . . . Our neuro-cultural theory postulates a facial affect program, located within the nervous system of all human beings, linking particular facial muscle movements with particular emotions" (p. 279). The same Universality Thesis was stated nearly four decades later when Ekman and Cordaro (2011) wrote that basic emotions have "distinctive universal signals" (p. 365) and that the "archetypal expressions for the basic emotions are all universally recognized" (p. 369).
The Universality Thesis has now risen to the status where it is sometimes stated without reference to empirical support. For example, Oatley and Johnson-Laird (2011) wrote that basic emotions "make ready characteristic suites of behavior, facial expressions, and bodily deportments" (p. 426) without a single reference to support the claim. In the United States, millions of dollars are spent yearly to train soldiers, police officers, airport security officials, doctors, nurses, and teachers to recognize emotions from facial expressions (Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011) . The specific emotion that is conveyed by a facial expression has been characterized as "obvious" (Ekman, 1980, p. 11) , and recognition of those emotions as "automatic" (Tracy & Robins, 2008, p. 81) , "easy" (Izard, 1977, p. 502) , and perhaps even "innate" (Martens, Hamlin, & Tracy, 2013) .
Obtaining scientific evidence testing the Universality Thesis, however, has not been easy, and attempts have resulted in controversy (Ekman, 1994; Fridlund, 1994; Izard, 1994; Russell, 1994 Russell, , 1995 Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernández-Dols, 2003) . For example, there is no agreed upon list of which emotions and feelings are, and which are not, conveyed by facial signals. The present article concerns the recognition (rather than production) side of the thesis and focuses on the facial expressions used in the research (specifically, posed vs. spontaneously produced). Support for the Universality Thesis would require that a large percentage of observers recognize the predicted emotion from the facial expression when the method involves spontaneous as well as posed expressions. Haidt and Keltner (1999, p. 238) wrote, "If the Universality Thesis is correct then those expressions that are pancultural should elicit very high recognition rates, generally in the 70 -90% range. . .even when methodological constraints are relaxed."
A review of evidence published between 1994 and 2010 on the claim of universal recognition found 21 studies that used facial expressions that were posed, three studies that used expressions that were spontaneous (Nelson & Russell, 2013) . Posed expressions, however, are unrepresentative of naturally occurring expressions. Posed expressions are created with exaggerated features, with the absence of distracting or irrelevant features, and with the intention of conveying a single emotion. The experimenter then selects the most recognizable. For example, Ekman and Friesen (1971) selected their facial stimuli from over 3,000 photographs. Evidence based on posed expres-sions so selected is not an adequate test of the Universality Thesis, for that thesis is about emotions and expressions that occur spontaneously and unintentionally in the everyday natural environment.
Studies in the 1920s through the 1950s had examined judgments of spontaneously produced facial expressions, but found low endorsement (i.e., a low percentage of observers matching the face to the predicted emotion; Sherman, 1927; Munn, 1940; Vinacke, 1949) . These studies were criticized on methodological grounds by Ekman (1982) from a Universalist perspective, and researchers largely returned to posed expressions. Between 1982 and were only seven studies on spontaneous facial expressions, and only one included cross-cultural data. Even so, endorsement was lower than the 70 -90% required by Haidt and Keltner (1999) -whether the expressions were presented as still photographs-26% (Motley & Camden, 1988) ; 38% (Yik, Meng, & Russell, 1998) , and 32% (Naab & Russell, 2007 )-or as dynamic video clips-63% (Hess & Blairy, 2001 ); 15% (Wagner, 1990) ; and 22% (Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead, 1986) . Wagner, Lewis, Ramsay, and Krediet (1992) examined observers' ability to detect eight emotions presented dynamically; no mean endorsements were reported, but of the 32 assessments only five were statistically significant.
In 2009, Matsumoto, Olide, Schug, Willingham, and Callan criticized these studies, again on methodological grounds, again from a Universalist perspective. The principal criticism was that the facial expressions studied might have lacked visible muscle movements needed to signal the emotion. And, indeed, evidence supports that possibility (e.g., Fernández-Dols & RuizBelda, 1995; Fernández-Dols, Carrera, & Crivelli, 2011; Fernández-Dols & Crivelli, 2013; Reisenzein, 2000; Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013) : the correlation between emotion and its predicted facial expression is low. Ironically, however, evidence that emotions fail to produce the hypothesized signals undermines, rather than rescues, the Universality Thesis; it attempts to save the recognition side of that thesis by weakening the production side.
Matsumoto and colleagues (2009) also offered a new study on the topic including cross-cultural data. Four groups of observers-Japanese, British, American, and international students residing in the United States-judged emotion from photographs of athletes who had just competed in judo matches at the 2004 Olympic Games. Endorsement was surprisingly low; the median was 28.2% (the range across different expressions: 3.5% to 82.8%; mean is unclear 1 ). And, endorsement varied significantly with culture. Matsumoto et al. (2009) 's study suffers from three related problems. First, judo matches at the Olympic Games are staged for an audience and are surrounded by photographers. Thus, this study does not eliminate entirely the possibility that expressions were posed. Second, the final set of 119 photos used in this study was selected from a pool of 2,735 photos based on Ekman and Friesen's (1978) Facial Action Coding System in order to enhance "signal clarity." This selection process undermines the claim that these faces sample what naturally occurs when emotions are experienced. And, third, no evidence was obtained on the emotional state of the expresser. Rather, the emotion predicted for each face was based solely on the configuration of muscle movements visible. For example, the smile of an athlete embarrassed by defeat would be predicted to be judged as signaling happiness; thus, when observers judged the smile as happy their judgment would be scored as correct, but when judged as embarrassed it would be scored as incorrect.
Even the small support for recognition is questionable because of the response format used. In six of these studies, observers were forced to choose (from a short list) a single emotion label for each facial expression.
2 This forced-choice format has been shown to introduce potential artifacts into the results (Frank & Stennett, 2001; Russell, 1993 Russell, , 1995 . The forced-choice format presupposes that each of the facial expressions shown conveys precisely one emotion and thus fails to examine whether observers attribute multiple emotions, or no emotion at all, to a facial expression.
In short, since Ekman's (1982) critique, only eight studies have examined recognition of emotion from spontaneous expressions, and they failed to provide clear support for the claim that peopleeven Western observers-agree on the emotions conveyed by facial expressions easily. The claim of universality has been examined with spontaneous expressions in only two cross-cultural studies. Further, no cross-cultural study has examined whether language influences observers' judgments of spontaneous facial expressions. In only two of the eight studies were the spontaneous facial expressions produced by adults from non-Western cultures. A claim of "universality" must extend beyond evidence provided by Westerners judging Westerners. The importance of the Universality Thesis for the study of emotion suggests a great need for empirical tests with appropriate methods and spontaneously produced facial expressions with observers from different cultures speaking different languages. No one study can fill this great need, but here we report data that inform the debate on the Universality Thesis and explore new avenues of research.
Overview of the Current Study
The current study tests the claim of universal recognition of emotion from spontaneous facial expressions with three samples of observers: English-speaking Americans, bilingual Palestinians responding in English, and bilingual Palestinians responding in Arabic. Palestinian culture differs from the American culture in many ways, including (but not limited to) geographical location, language, religion, cultural values, and the presence of military threat and conflict. To our knowledge, no study on Palestinians' interpretation of facial expressions of emotions exists. A bilingual Palestinian sample is a novel contribution to the scientific literature on spontaneous facial expressions of emotion, for it allowed us to distinguish language from other aspects of culture. In the current study, the two Palestinian groups are Arabs born and raised in Palestinian households, some from the same regions attending the same school and some from neighboring regions attending neighboring schools in the West Bank/Israel. Both groups were recruited from schools in which English is taught as a mandatory second language; practical reasons precluded random assignment of individuals, but classrooms were chosen arbitrarily to complete the study in either English or Arabic. Thus, we are confident that, within sampling error, the two Palestinian groups differed only in the language in which they responded.
Because of past problems with response format, we opted for a unipolar response format (Russell & Carroll, 1999) to assess judgment of the emotion(s) conveyed by a face -a yes/no format with a list of emotion and feeling labels and the addition of an intensity rating scale. Observers had the option of selecting none, one, or more labels and of indicating the intensity with which each selected emotion is expressed. Unlike the usual forced-choice format, the unipolar format used here is also suitable for blends, faces thought to express two emotions simultaneously. Our format complements the others and can reveal something of the observers' interpretation of a facial expression not revealed by other formats. In two of the samples (time constraints prevented gathering these data from the Palestinians-in-Arabic), additional ratings were included to examine observers' broad interpretations of the facial expressions; observers judged the degree of pleasantness and, separately, the arousal of each face.
The most important issue is the set of spontaneous facial expressions and how to determine ahead of time the emotion each face expresses. We used as stimuli 22 spontaneous facial expressions of Papua New Guineans (Ekman, 1980) . There are several advantages to using these photographs. The facial expressions occurred naturally in the Papua New Guineans' home environment rather than artificially in the laboratory. Isolated from Western civilization, this hunter-gatherer tribe was ignorant of the uses of a camera:
There was an enormous advantage to being with a people who were not camera-shy. They did not know what a camera did so they were not self-conscious about it, and much of their social life was outdoors and easily seen. (Ekman, 1980, p. 11) Ekman (1980) assessed the emotion or affective state of the expresser by means of two sources of information: first, the expresser's situation and nonfacial behavior and, second, the configuration of visible muscle movements on the expresser's face. For each facial expression, Ekman provided brief descriptions of "how these emotions are registered in the faces (or for that matter, any face)" (p. 11). Table 1 provides a description of the visible muscle movements as coded with Ekman and Friesen's (1978) Facial Action Coding System. According to Ekman, each face shows the muscle movement configuration specific to either exactly one or, in the case of blends, exactly two emotions. Finally, Ekman selected for publication those photographs that showed clear examples of the purportedly universal expressions. The facial expressions were claimed to convey either traditional basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust), nontraditional basic emotions (interest, embarrassment), or nonemotion feelings (relaxation, hesitancy, perplexity). Ekman (1980) claimed that these spontaneous facial expressions he selected are universally recognized: "Since these pictures show universal facial expressions, the message conveyed by each face will usually be quite obvious" (p. 11). Ekman's claim is widely disseminated. Since its publication in 1980, Ekman's book The Face of Man-in which these facial expressions appear-has been cited in 193 scholarly articles (as of 2013 April 21) as well as in recent introductory psychology, physiology, and sociology textbooks as evidence of universality (e.g., Carlson, 2007; Macionis, 2002; Matsumoto & Juang, 2013) . 
Method

Participants
Materials
Photographs. Facial expressions were black-and-white 2Љ ϫ 3Љ (approximate; photographs varied in shape and size) photographs of 22 spontaneous facial expressions of members of the South Fore of New Guinea from Face of Man (Ekman, 1980) . Selection of photographs. There were 68 photographs in total published by Ekman (1980) . We selected those 22 photographs that showed a clear, frontal view of the face and included as many different emotions as possible, with a balance between positive and negative emotions. All of these expressions are explicitly labeled by Ekman (1980) . Of the 22 facial expressions, 18 were predicted to signal a single emotion or This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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feeling state: traditional basic emotions include happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, and disgust; nontraditional basic emotions include interest and embarrassment; and nonemotion feelings include relaxation, perplexity, and hesitancy. Each of the remaining four facial expressions are predicted to signal a blend of two emotions or feelings: fear/disgust, fear/surprise, interest/ fear, and perplexity/anger.
Translation of Emotion and Feeling Labels
The 12 English emotion or feeling labels were translated into Arabic using a standard translation-back-translation procedure. For each label, a list of possible Arabic translations taken from standard English-Arabic dictionaries and bilingual Palestinians was presented to five bilingual speakers, who indicated the single closest and most commonly used Arabic translation for each English label. The closest Arabic synonyms for each of the 12 English labels was then presented to a different set of five bilinguals who were asked to back-translate the Arabic label into English. The back-translation that returned to the original English label by the most judges was chosen as the translation. At least three of the five judges had returned the original English label in all 12 cases.
Procedure
For all three samples, participants were tested in a classroom setting in which no interaction between participants was allowed.
Each participant received a booklet with general instructions followed by 22 separate sheets each showing a single facial expression and a rating form. There were four different orders of presentation of the faces (two random and two reversed).
Emotion rating. For each face, the participant indicated whether each of the 12 emotions or feelings was present or not by circling yes or no. If the participant circled yes, he or she indicated the intensity to which the feeling was present in the face by circling a number from 1 (barely) to 6 (maximum intensity). There were 12 labels: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, interest, relaxed, embarrassment, disgust, contempt, surprise, perplexed, and hesitant . The set of labels included each of the labels Ekman used to describe the feeling conveyed by the faces plus one additional label (contempt) added because Ekman and Friesen (1986) had proposed contempt as a basic emotion with a unique facial expression.
Pleasantness and arousal ratings. The pleasantness and arousal ratings were completed only by the Americans and Palestinians-in-English; Palestinians-in-Arabic did not complete these ratings due to time constraints on the research by the school administrator. For each face, participants were asked to assume that "you know this person slightly" and to indicate the degree of pleasantness and arousal. The pleasantness rating scale ranged from Ϫ3 (extremely unpleasant) to 3 (extremely pleasant). The arousal rating scale ranged from 0 (extreme sleepiness) to 6 (extremely high arousal). Note. For each facial expression used in this study, the first column provides the plate identification and Ekman's (1980) predicted label. The second column gives the expression's facial action units as coded by Ekman and Friesen's 1978 Facial Action Coding system. The third, fourth, and fifth columns give the between-sample correlations in the endorsement of profiles across the 12 labels for each facial expression. Each correlation represents how similarly a sample pair applied the emotion labels to each of the 22 facial expressions. Bolded correlations are significant at p Ͻ .05.
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Results
Meaning of a Face as the Predicted Label: Do Observers Match Each Facial Expression With Its Predicted Feeling?
Endorsement of the predicted label. For each face, Table 2 gives its endorsement for the predicted label (the percentage of observers in each sample who circled yes). Overall mean was 65% for Americans (66%, 61%, and 66%, for basic emotions, nonemotion feelings, and blends, respectively), 55% for Palestinians-inEnglish (54%, 50%, and 60%, for basic emotions, nonemotion feelings, and blends, respectively), and 44% for Palestinians-inArabic (50%, 39%, and 37%, for basic emotions, nonemotion feelings, and blends, respectively). The question is how large that percentage must be to claim support for the prediction. Different standards can be set; we examine five, definitions of which are given in Table 3 . Standard 1 requires that endorsement of the predicted label significantly exceed what is expected by chance; given the 12 labels provided, chance is 8.3% for single-label faces and 16.7% for blends on the assumption that observers selected one label per face and selected that label randomly. Standard 2 requires that endorsement of the predicted label significantly exceed the base rate with which that label is used. Standard 2 is based on the assumption that a facial expression might be associated with a predicted label beyond chance simply because some labels are used more frequently than others (Wagner, 1990) . Standard 3 requires that endorsement of the predicted label significantly exceed 50% on the grounds that observers who selected randomly between yes and no for each emotion label would achieve 50%. Single-label expressions: Traditional basic 37B-happy 64 feelings  61  39  50  50  39  61  Blended expressions 12-afraid 52 Note. N ϭ 60 for Americans; N ϭ 60 for Palestinians-in-English; N ϭ 44 for Palestinians-in-Arabic. For each facial expression used in this study, the first column provides the plate identification and Ekman's (1980) predicted label. The column labeled Yes gives the percentage of observers in each sample who selected the predicted label for each facial expression (regardless of whether they selected any additional labels); the column labeled No gives the percentage of observers in each sample who never selected the predicted label for each facial expression (regardless of whether they selected any additional labels). For each sample, the different standards correspond to each of the five ways used to set the standard for determining statistical significance. Please see Table 3 for definitions of the standards. For each standard, tick marks (✓) indicate that endorsement of the predicted label met or significantly exceeded that standard, p Ͻ .05. Tests of proportions, ␣ ϭ .05, were used to examine significant differences for standards 1, 2, 3, and 5. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Standard 4 requires the predicted label to be the modal response. Standard 5 requires that the predicted label be modal and be endorsed significantly more frequently than any other label. A tick mark (✓) in Table 2 indicates a result that met or exceeded the standard. (For blended expressions, the standard was liberal: endorsement of either of the predicted labels had to meet or exceed the standard.) The mean number of facial expressions across samples that passed was 21 for standard 1, 14 for standard 2, 8 for standard 3, 7 for standard 4, and 2 for standard 5.
Sample differences in endorsement of the predicted label. Sample differences were found for the percentage who endorsed the predicted label, which was highest for the Americans, followed by Palestinians-in-English, and lowest for Palestinians-in-Arabic-both separately for each type of facial expression and overall (see Table 2 ). For the 13 single-label facial expressions representing "basic emotions," the difference between Americans and Palestinians-in-English in mean endorsement was marginal, z ϭ 1.34, p ϭ .09. The difference between Americans and Palestiniansin-Arabic was significant, z ϭ 1.64, p ϭ .05. The two Palestinian groups did not significantly differ, z ϭ .30, p ϭ .38. For the five facial expressions representing nonemotion feelings (perplexed, relaxed, hesitant), the difference between Americans and Palestinians-in-English in mean endorsement was not significant, z ϭ 1.21, p ϭ .11. The difference between Americans and Palestinians-in-Arabic was significant, z ϭ 2.22, p Ͻ .02. The two Palestinian groups did not significantly differ, z ϭ 1.11, p ϭ .13. For the four blended expressions, the difference between Americans and Palestinians-in-English in mean endorsement was not significant, z ϭ .68, p ϭ .25. The difference between Americans and Palestinians-in-Arabic was significant, z ϭ 2.93, p Ͻ .001. The two Palestinian groups significantly differed, z ϭ 2.32, p Ͻ .02.
Nonendorsement of the predicted label. Table 2 also gives the nonendorsement (the percentage of Americans, Palestiniansin-English, and Palestinians-in-Arabic who circled no) to the predicted label for each face (M ϭ 33%, 46%, and 49%, respectively for 13 single-label faces representing basic emotions; M ϭ 39%, 50%, and 61%, respectively, for five single-label faces representing nonemotion feelings; M ϭ 66%, 32%, and 79%, respectively, for four blended expressions). One implication is that this high percentage of no responses would pass standard 1 (as defined in Table 3 ) frequently. Indeed, of the 22 faces, the number of facial expressions across samples for which no responses passed standard 1 was 18 faces (9 basic emotion, 5 nonemotion feeling faces, and 4 blended expressions) for the Americans, 21 faces (12 basic emotion, 5 nonemotion feeling faces, and 4 blended expressions) for the Palestinians-in-English, and 19 faces (10 basic emotion, 5 nonemotion feeling faces, and 4 blended expressions) for the Palestinians-in-Arabic. Setting a standard such that both yes and no pass is nonsense.
Number of labels selected per face. Standard 1 (as defined in Table 3 ) was based on the assumption-implicit in Ekman's (1980) presentation-that observers select one label for each face (or two in the case of blends). Table 4 gives, for each sample, the average number of labels selected for each type of facial expression. Our list of 12 labels included nine that represent basic emotions (happy, sad, angry, afraid, surprised, disgusted, interested, embarrassed, and contemptuous) and three nonemotion feelings (hesitant, perplexed, and relaxed). Table 4 therefore gives the average number (out of the 9) that represent basic emotions and, separately, the average number out of the total 12 labels. By either measure, the assumption that observers select one label per face (or two for blends) is not supported.
There was also variation between samples: the average number of basic emotion labels selected per face was highest for Americans, followed by Palestinians-in-English, and lowest for Palestinians-in-Arabic. The difference between Americans and Palestinians-in-English was not significant, independent samples t 119 ϭ .43, p ϭ . 67. Americans and Palestinians-in-English each differed significantly from Palestinians-in-Arabic (t 101 ϭ 6.75 and 4.77, all ps Ͻ .001, respectively). The same results occurred when the total number of labels was considered. The difference between Americans and Palestinians-in-English was marginal, independent samples t 119 ϭ 1.77, p ϭ . 08. Americans and Palestinians-in-English each differed significantly from Palestinians-in-Arabic (t 101 ϭ 6.75 and 4.77, all ps Ͻ .001, respectively).
Intensity ratings: Modal response versus the predicted emotion. The same pattern of results occurred when the mean intensity ratings were substituted for mean endorsement. We asked whether the predicted label received a higher intensity rating than a comparison label, either the modal response or, in cases where the modal response matched the predicted label, the second modal response. Table 5 gives these results. The predicted label received a significantly higher intensity rating than the comparison label across all three samples for only two of the 13 single-label basic emotion faces (14Ϫsad and 16Ϫdisgusted), for none of the five nonemotion feeling faces, and for two of the four blended expressions (9Ϫafraid, surprised and 19Ϫperplexed, angry). These intensity ratings provide another strict method of testing the predicted label; these results join with standards 1-5 of assessing endorsement (see Table 2 ) to show that even when observers saw the predicted emotion in the face, that emotion was not the most intensely expressed. Requires that endorsement of the predicted label significantly exceed the base rate with which that label is used; based on the assumption that a facial expression might be associated with a predicted label beyond chance simply because some labels are used more frequently than others (Wagner, 1990) 3 Requires that endorsement of the predicted label significantly exceed 50% on the grounds that observers who selected randomly between Yes and No for each emotion label would achieve 50% 4
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Sample differences in intensity ratings. How intensely observers thought the predicted emotion was expressed in a face varied both by culture and by language in a pattern identical to the traditional analysis of endorsement 3 -Just as individuals were more likely to see Ekman's predicted emotion if they (like Ekman) are American and interpreted the facial expressions in English, these individuals also saw Ekman's predicted emotion as more intensely expressed. Americans generally rated the predicted emotion as more intense than did either group of Palestinians, and Palestinians-in-English generally rated the predicted emotion as more intense than did Palestinians-in-Arabic.
Meaning of the Face as Its Consensual Label
Another possible measure of "recognition" sets aside the predicted label and simply relies on the modal responses of a particular sample-a procedure known as consensus scoring (Barchard & Russell, 2006) . Consensus scoring is useful because even if Palestinians disagreed with Ekman's predicted label, they might agree with the American modal response. Here, the American modal response was therefore used as a standard.
In seven cases, the American modal response coincided with Ekman's predicted label, and, therefore, these analyses were not repeated. Table 6 shows results for the 15 cases in which the American modal response differed from Ekman's predicted label. Agreement was assessed by examining the percentage of observers in each Palestinian sample who selected the American modal response, and also by the five standards previously used (defined in Table 3 ).
For the 15 cases shown in Table 6 , Palestinians were generally significantly more likely to agree with the American modal response than with Ekman's predicted label. On average, 69% of Palestinians-in-English agreed with the American modal response whereas 52% did so for the Ekman-label; this difference was significant, z ϭ 2.61, p Ͻ .01. Similarly, 63% of Palestinians-inArabic agreed with the American modal response whereas 40% did so for the Ekman-label; this difference was significant, z ϭ 2.75, p Ͻ .01.
Of these 15 cases, the American modal response received weak support (passed by standards 2, 3, and 4; defined in Table 3 ) for seven faces (four conveying basic emotions, two nonemotion feelings, and one blend) by the Palestinians-in-English and for 10 faces by the Palestinians-in-Arabic (seven conveying basic emotions, two nonemotion feelings, and one blend). The American modal response received strong support (also passed by standard 5; defined in Table 3 ) for three faces (two conveying basic emotions, one nonemotion feeling) by the Palestinians-in-English and for seven faces (three conveying basic emotions, three nonemotion feelings, and one blend) by the Palestinians-in-Arabic.
Consensus scoring showed that Palestinians, regardless of the language in which they were responding, agreed with the American modal response moderately, 66% of the time. Although the American prediction received more support than Ekman's prediction, it still failed to fully capture Palestinian observers' interpretation of these spontaneous facial expressions. Thus, when attributing emotions to these facial expressions, observers are agreeing on labels that often differ from the original predictions, but even those labels are not enough. 3 Sample differences for intensity ratings were revealed by the results of a mixed-design, repeated measures ANOVA (␣ ϭ .05), in which sample (three levels: American, Palestinian-in-English, Palestinians-in-Arabic) was a between-subjects factor and facial expression (26 levels: 18 faces with a single label; 4 blends with 2 labels each) was a within-subjects factor; the dependent variable was the intensity score attributed to the predicted emotion label. The main effect for sample, F(1, 161) ϭ 17.31, p Ͻ .001, revealed a pattern identical to the traditional analysis of endorsement. On average, the mean intensity score (on a scale from 1 barely to 6 maximum) given to the predicted label was highest for Americans (2.4), followed by Palestinians-in-English (1.9), and lowest for Palestinians-inArabic (1.5). The difference between each comparison was significant at the .01 level. The Face ϫ Sample interaction was also significant, F(50, 4025) ϭ 5.19, p Ͻ .001. Americans generally rated the predicted emotion as more intense than did either group of Palestinians, and Palestinians-inEnglish generally rated the predicted emotion as more intense than did Palestinians-in-Arabic. Note. In each cell, the number on top is the mean number of "basic emotion" labels (happy, sad, angry, afraid, surprised, disgusted, interested, embarrassed and contemptuous) selected per facial expression. Numbers in parenthesis are the mean number of the (12) total labels. Independent samples t-tests were used to examine significant differences between means. Means in the same row or column that do not share the same subscript significantly differ at p Ͻ .05.
No Single Emotion Label Captures the Judgment of a Facial Expression
Recall that observers selected more than one label per facial expression, a finding that challenged the traditional assumption that each face clearly expresses exactly one or, in the case of blends, exactly two emotions. But if observers are agreeing on some sort of emotional meaning of a face, one would expect observers to apply each emotion label to the facial expressions narrowly-a distribution in which an emotion label is applied very frequently to some faces and very infrequently for others, with few cases falling in the middle. Consider, for example, Figure 1 : this graph shows, for each facial expression, the percentage of observers who circled yes for happy. The results are what one would predict from our usual way of thinking: a distribution in which observers circled yes for happy frequently for some faces and infrequently for other faces, with very few cases falling in the middle of the distribution. Table 7 shows that the label happy was endorsed frequently for five faces, infrequently for 16 faces, and only one case fell in the middle.
Conversely, the graph for sad shown in Figure 2 does not show this distribution. Instead, Figure 2 reveals sad was applied very frequently to a few faces and very infrequently to a few others, but with the majority of the cases falling in the middle. Further, the graph for sad is representative of the graphs for the remaining emotion and feeling labels; Table 7 shows this trend for the remaining labels. When one divides the continuum in quarters, the top and bottom quarters each represent high and low endorsements; the middle two represent a violation of that principle, with intermediate degrees of endorsement. Thus, with the exception of happy, observers applied the emotion and feeling labels to the facial expressions broadly; each emotion label was attributed to several other faces predicted to express other emotions.
Meaning of a Face as Its Profile of Endorsements: Similarity Between Samples
The emotional meaning of a facial expression can be thought of as its profile of endorsements across the 12 emotion and feeling labels. Single-label facial expressions 37B-happy
Table 5 Intensity Ratings Attributed to the Predicted Label Versus a Comparison Label on Standard 5: Faces for Which the Predicted Label Received a Significantly Higher Intensity Rating Than a Sample's Comparison Label
Note. For each facial expression used in this study, the first column provides the plate identification and Ekman's (1980) predicted label. For cases in which the sample's modal response matched the predicted label, the sample's second modal response is provided; these are shown in italics. Tick marks (✓) indicate that the predicted label received a significantly higher intensity rating than the sample's modal response or (in cases for which the modal response matched the predicted label) the second modal response. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Table 1 shows, for each pair of samples, the correlation between their profiles. The correlations were all positive (range: .50 to .95), but showed what Haidt and Keltner (1999) called a gradient of recognition-that is, facial expressions vary in how much agreement they elicited in different cultures as to their general emotional meaning. Plate 17Ϫangry illustrates one end of a continuum: observers from all three samples showed a similar profile. Conversely, plate 37BϪhappy illustrates the other end of the continuum: observers from the different samples applied the emotion and feeling labels in different proportions. Three faces (37BϪhappy, 8mϪsurprised, and 26AϪinterested) failed to achieve significant degree of agreement between samples. 
Note. N ϭ 60 for Americans; N ϭ 60 for Palestinians-in-English; N ϭ 44 for Palestinians-in-Arabic. The plate is the identification number given to each facial expression (Ekman, 1980) . The column labeled Yes gives the percentage of Palestinians who selected the American modal response (regardless of whether they selected any additional labels); this table is based only on the 15 facial expressions for which the predicted label differed from the American modal response. For each sample, the different standards correspond to each of the five ways used to set the standard for determining statistical significance (defined in Table 3 ); for each standard, tick marks (✓) indicate that endorsement of the American modal response significantly exceeded that standard, p Ͻ .05. Figure 1 . Percentage of observers in each sample who attributed the label happy to each facial expression. Each facial expression is identified by its plate number and its predicted label (Ekman, 1980) . The facial expressions are ranked along the x-axis in decreasing order (based on combined mean across the three samples), the purpose of which is to illustrate a distribution in which participants attributed the label happy frequently for some faces and infrequently for other faces, with very few cases falling in the middle of the distribution. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Multidimensional Scaling for Facial Expressions
The results so far present a paradox. Observers from different samples generally agreed with each other in associating emotions with facial expressions (as was indicated in Table 1 by high correlations across samples in their application of labels to the faces), but observers disagreed on the single best label. The analyses that tested whether each facial expression signals a discrete emotion showed little agreement within a sample on the predicted label or the modal label as well as variation across samples. Therefore, no single emotion label captures the judgment of a facial expression. Rather, the association between a facial expression and an emotion label is best described as a gradient; each emotion is seen in many facial expressions but to varying degrees. To explore that similarity, we used Individual Differences Scaling (INDSCAL; Carroll & Chang, 1970) , which is a nonmetric, weighted multidimensional scaling technique that provides a geometric representation of the similarities among stimuli-in this case, the 22 facial expressions. Facial expressions are placed on a "space" in which those closer together are more similar, and those farther apart are less similar. The similarity between two faces was defined as the correlation between their profiles of endorsement of the 12 emotion and feeling labels. A matrix of similarities between faces was created for each sample and combined to create a single square symmetric data set. Each sample was treated as a separate "subject," and INDSCAL provides "weights" that assess how subjects differ in their emphasis on each dimension of the space.
Stress, canonical correlations, variance accounted for, and interpretability all suggested a two-dimensional solution. Stress was substantially reduced by adding a second dimension (from .27 to .17), but not by adding a third (from .17 to .12). The first canonical correlations were high and significant (r ϭ .97 to .98) as were the second (r ϭ .86 to .91), and third (r ϭ .71 to .76), all ps Ͻ .01. The first dimension accounted for 69% of the variance, the second dimension for 21% of the variance, and the third dimension for 9% of the variance. Dimensions beyond the first two defied our attempts at interpretation.
The two-dimensional solution is shown in Figure 3 . Note first the absence of clusters in Figure 3 ; that is, faces labeled by observers as sad did not cluster together, those labeled as angry did not cluster together, and so on. This pattern is consistent with previous results that faces are not well characterized by single labels. The pleasantness and arousal ratings were used to help interpret each dimension. Because Americans and Palestinians-inEnglish were so similar in their attributions of pleasantness (r ϭ .92) and arousal (r ϭ .92) (all ps Ͻ .05), the American values were used in this analysis. In this way, the Palestinians-in-Arabic, who Note. The number in each cell is out of 22 facial expressions. Figure 2 . Percentage of observers in each sample who attributed the label sad to each facial expression. Each facial expression is identified by its plate number and its predicted label (Ekman, 1980) . The facial expressions are ranked along the x-axis in decreasing order (based on combined means across the three samples). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
did not provide these two ratings, could be included in the analysis comparing the pleasantness and arousal ratings to the multidimensional scaling values. The first dimension was clearly valence, contrasting unpleasant versus pleasant feelings. In Figure 3 , faces that fall on the left are clearly negative; those that fall on the right side are clearly positive. Our interpretation of this dimension is consistent with prior research (Abelson & Sermat, 1962; Engen, Levy, & Schlosberg, 1958; Gladstones, 1962; Schlosberg, 1954; Russell & Bullock, 1986b) . The pleasantness ratings verified this interpretation; correlation between this dimension's scale values and the pleasantness ratings was .90, (p Ͻ .01).
The second dimension is less clear, yet can plausibly be interpreted as some combination of certainty (contrasting response to novel vs. familiar events) and dominance (contrasting response to assertiveness/feelings of control vs. passivity/feelings of submissiveness); neither interpretation works well alone. In Figure 3 , for example, high values went to faces labeled by observers as perplexed, interested, afraid, and surprised, low values to faces labeled by observers as happy, angry, disgusted, and sad.
Arousal was not a plausible interpretation for either dimension. The arousal ratings did not significantly correlate with the multidimensional scaling values of either the first (r ϭ Ϫ.32, p ϭ .15) or second dimension (r ϭ Ϫ.26, p ϭ .25).
Sample differences. For each sample, INDSCAL provides a weirdness score ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating that the subject fits the space poorly. Americans, Palestinians-in-English, and Palestinians-in-Arabic had weirdness scores of .35, .18, and .27, respectively. All fit the space well, albeit with some differences.
INDSCAL also provides weights that indicate the relative importance of each dimension to each sample; weights range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no importance and 1 indicating high importance. Americans, Palestinians-in-English, and Palestiniansin-Arabic had weights of .68, .89, and .90, respectively, for Dimension 1 and weights of .64, .35, and .30 for Dimension 2. Thus, Americans emphasized both dimensions more equally than did either group of Palestinians, whereas the Palestinians-in-Arabic gave more than three times the emphasis to the first dimension as they did to the second. Thus, there is a clear difference for culture, but not language.
General Discussion and Conclusion
Conclusions from this study intertwine methodological and substantive issues. Consider first the methods used in empirical tests of the Universality Thesis. The standard way to assess an observer's attribution of emotion to another's facial expression has been (Ekman, 1980) and each sample's modal response in the following order: Americans, Palestinians-in-English, and Palestinians-in-Arabic. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
to use a forced-choice response format. Indeed, this format has been defended vigorously when some of its faults were pointed out (Frank & Stennett, 2001) . The commonly used forced-choice format, rather than faithfully capturing the observer's spontaneous response to the face, imposes the experimenter's preconceived notions on the observer, principally, the assumption that the observer interprets the face in terms of exactly one of a small number of emotions specified by the experimenter. Here we found evidence that observers from two cultures speaking two languages all saw multiple emotions in the same face, albeit to different degrees. Further, observers interpreted the facial expressions in terms of broad dimensions, certainly pleasantnessϪunpleasantness but also possibly dominanceϪsubmissiveness, certaintyϪuncertainty, or assertiveϪpassive. Forced-choice response formats have their uses, but we see no empirical support for the assumption that such formats adequately capture the observer's understanding of a facial expression. Substantively, the evidence seen here is inconsistent with the theory that categories of emotion have specific facial signals, but is more consistent with the theory that categories of emotion are fuzzy sets and that categorization of emotion from facial expression is a matter of degree rather than all-or-none (Russell & Bullock, 1986a) .
In testing the Universality Thesis, the experimenter must set a standard for claiming "recognition." There is no agreed upon gold standard, and, as shown in Table 2 , success or failure of the prediction for a given face depends on where the standard is set-the higher the level, the stricter the standard, the fewer faces pass. Our Standard 1, rising above chance, is the most commonly used and advocated (Ekman, 1994) , but is far from adequate. In perhaps the ultimate irony in setting the standard this low, we found that for many faces, the no response-denying the presence of the predicted label-also passed the Standard 1 criterion. A specific label can be endorsed significantly more often than chance merely because that label is used more frequently across all faces. With only random responding considered, the Universality Thesis reduces to the claim that humans are not random in associating faces with emotions. Nonrandomness can be explained with various hypotheses other than the Universality Thesis as usually stated. An observer might initially interpret the face in terms of broad dimensions-such as valence, arousal, a social message, or an action tendency (Fridlund, 1997; Frijda & Tcherkassoff, 1997; Russell, 1994 Russell, , 1997 Scherer & Grandjean, 2008; Yik & Russell, 1999) -and then select those emotion labels that are consistent with that interpretation. For example, if an observer sees nothing more than negative valence in the facial expression, then any positive label can be eliminated, and the choice is among negative labels. The predicted label for a face must exceed that label's base rate and must be significantly more often endorsed than rejected. Thus, Standards 2 (exceeding base rate) and 3 (exceeding 50% chance) both set necessary requirements for supporting the prediction, but they, too, are insufficient. With the response format used here, more than one label can exceed both of these standards. Standard 4, which required that the predicted label be endorsed significantly more often than any other label, is reasonable way to operationalize the implication of the Universality Thesis that people agree with one another on the emotion signaled by the face. The question is whether Standard 4 is sufficient. That is, must the prediction also pass the higher bar set by Standard 5? Standard 5 required that the modal label be endorsed significantly more often than any other label. This standard too seems to be implied by the Universality Thesis, or at least by strong versions of that thesis. Our conclusion is that the predicted label must exceed Standard 4 for even weak support and exceed Standard 5 for strong support. Let's consider a best case scenario for the Universality Thesis by examining only those faces predicted to convey exactly one traditional basic emotion; these are the first seven faces in Table 2 . Only two (out of the seven) faces (14Ϫsad, 16Ϫdisgusted) received even weak support across all three samples. No face received strong support across all three samples. The one face that came close-received strong support by two out of the three samples-was plate 16Ϫdisgusted, predicted to convey exclusively disgust.
In testing the Universality Thesis, the experimenter must also choose what facial expressions to show to the observer. The standard solution to this problem has been to ask actors to pose specific emotions or facial configurations and then to select among the results those expressions that most closely conform to the experimenter's theory. Given the human ability to mime all manner of states of mind, scientists might have anticipated that actors could successfully mime emotions with their faces. With hindsight, one must wonder why scientists relied so heavily on deliberately and intentionally mimed emotional expressions to test a theory about what humans do spontaneously and unintentionally in their daily lives. The present study joins the very small set of previous studies on spontaneous expressions in showing that the high endorsement found with posed expressions are not replicated with spontaneous expressions. We found no empirical support for the continued use of posed expressions as a substitute for spontaneous expressions.
Each type of expression raises methodological questions. Posed expressions have the unique advantage that the intention of the poser is known and, therefore, comes with the name of the intended emotion. Spontaneous expressions do not, and there is no sure means of stating the emotion of the expresser. Researchers can create or observe situations that reliably elicit certain emotions, but there are individual differences in response to a given situation. Researchers can assess the emotion elicited, but there is no sure means to assess emotion. Prior studies of spontaneous expressions have used different combinations of these methods, to varying degrees of success. In the current study, we used photographs of expressions in which the emotion of the expresser was assessed through both of these ways, but questions can always be raised. Matsumoto and Hwang (2011) added that, to test the Universality Thesis, the spontaneous expressions must possess "signal clarity," in effect requiring that they match the posed expressions used in the standard method. This requirement begs the question of whether spontaneous expressions do in fact typically match posed expressions.
Consensus scoring bypasses endless controversy over the expresser's emotion. Consensus scoring allows researchers to examine agreement across groups (such as cultural or language groups) without a priori knowledge of the expresser's emotion. Positive results with consensus scoring would be necessary but not sufficient support for the Universality Thesis. Conversely, a failure of consensus scoring to show high agreement across cultures and languages-as found here-challenges the Universality Thesis. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The present results thus join prior research on spontaneous expressions in questioning the often assumed Universality Thesis. Even with American college students, endorsement for spontaneous expressions fell below Haidt and Keltner's (1999) criterion of 70 -90%. Universality has been claimed on the basis of a small number of cultures sampled, and so the addition of two Arabic samples, one responding in Arabic, is important. With these samples, endorsement of the predicted label, rather than universal, was found to vary with both culture and language. There was agreement across cultures and languages on one point: observers see not one emotion but multiple emotions and nonemotional feelings in the same face. The predicted label is not always seen in a face and, when it is, it is rarely seen as the most intensely expressed.
The Universality Thesis is rarely stated in a precise manner. Our results challenge the commonly assumed version of that thesisthat observers universally see a specific emotion in certain facial expressions-but are consistent with the Minimal Universality Thesis (Russell, 1995) . Observers in different cultures have a similar interpretation of faces, although not typically one captured by a single emotion label.
